A QUESTION OF LEVERAGE Part 3: A matter of principle By Jaewoo Choo Part 1: China's role in the Korea crisis Part 2: Sorry, not interested SEOUL - At the onset of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, the country proclaimed the fundamental diplomatic principles that would guide its foreign behavior and diplomatic practice in the future. These "Five Principles of Co-Existence" remain in effect to this day. According to the Chinese leadership and intellectuals, what makes them effective is the fact that they were based on historical and revolutionary experiences during losing struggles that lasted for a century, from the first Opium War until the foundation of the new China in 1949. Among those five principles, one stands out in China's fundamental position on the current nuclear crisis as well as on its relations with North Korea. That is, "Respect another's sovereignty and do not intervene in another's domestic political affairs." The principle of respecting a state's sovereignty over its domestic political affairs is more than a theory. There are numerous cases that illustrate the consistency with which China has adhered to this belief in practice. The very first one came in the wake of the US intervention in the Korean War in 1950. That case illustrated that China, if a third party intervened in a state's domestic affairs, and if this action were to present a threat to China's national interests, would not restrict itself from any and all possible kinds of retaliation or counteraction. Thus far, the principle still stands valid in China's diplomacy. It still opposes states intervening in any other state's domestic political affairs, regardless of the cause or reasons. Even if the intervening party's action is for humanitarian reasons or has benign intentions, such as to restore order and peace, China still opposes it if what it regards as proper procedures are ignored. China only supports such an action if the cause is taken to the international community, including such organizations as the United Nations. China's justification and rationale behind its belief in the non-intervention principle are deeply rooted in its historical lessons from its struggle to achieve what it is now. For long, it has been an advocate of the rights of a country to decide its guiding philosophy. It bases its argument on the case in which a state has the right to choose and decide its own course of development in accordance with the circumstances and surroundings. Once a state selects a course, others have the obligation to respect its decision and therefore will have to show respect based on equality. In return, it advocates, one will be respected by others. Otherwise, confrontation will be inevitable, as was proved during the Cold War period. It is a result of this firm belief that China to this day keeps practicing non-intervention principles, regardless of the other state's size, economic and political strength, ideology, etc. Furthermore, what precipitates this principle is China's firm opposition to imposing one's values and ideology upon others. Such action has, especially in China's case, prompted an immediate strain in its relationship with states who see things differently. This is clearly reflected in its relations with the United States in recent times and with the former Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early '60s. China, therefore, has rarely exerted any form of diplomatic influence or pressure on those states under the criticism of the international community for irrational and unreasonable behavior. Instead, it has its own principles in dealing with those states that generate much concern about the stability and peace of the world. These principles to which China tends to adhere in managing an international crisis involving a third nation can be drawn from empirical observation of Chinese diplomacy. First, China would not take any kind of action to engage itself physically in the process of resolving the third nation's problem, whether it has international repercussions or is limited within the boundary of one's territory. It would express its concern in the name of world peace and the public good by issuing an official statement. Second, it would incessantly repeat that the parties involved in the crisis should find a solution by themselves. No matter how long it would take until the problem is solved, China would repetitively emphasize the same view of the way the crisis should be handled. It might flinch a bit if there were a change in the direction of the course of the crisis. However, one thing very worthy of note is China's strong adherence to the principle of "only those directly concerned are eligible to take an appropriate and proper action to resolve the crisis in which they are involved". Third, if the crisis requires a third party's help, China would always point its finger to an international organization, such as the United Nations. It has a strong belief, for instance, that the UN is the sole legitimate third party that has the authority to bring an international crisis for solution, if required. It also regards the UN as the best possible source of means for solving an international crisis in a peaceful manner. Nevertheless, China's record as a permanent member of the UN Security Council does not correlate with its belief and words. If the circumstantial constraints such as ideology and political settings were meaningful excuses for China's controversial voting behavior during the Cold War, it is no longer so in the post-Cold War era. China, however, still shows irrational and sometimes unreasonable behavior in its votes at the United Nations. When the North Korean nuclear-arms crisis, for instance, was brought to discussion to decide whether it should be referred to the UN, all necessary and possible terms for a resolution were also subsequently discussed. During the entire course of the discussion, China remained unyielding in its opposition to economic sanctions against North Korea and submitting the issue to the Security Council. At the same time, it reaffirmed its unwillingness to play a mediating role with regard to the North Korean nuclear issue. Conclusion The North Korea nuclear crisis is certainly an international problem, where the security interests of many states are at stake. Conventional wisdom claims that a road to a peaceful solution requires tremendous international and diplomatic cooperation. While several types of multilateral ways of approach to a peaceful solution have been suggested by the concerned states with due respect to their national profile and interests, however, efforts to seek cooperation at the bilateral level are concurrently being pursued. Along the course of this effort, China, because of its traditionally close relations and others' assumptions about its leverage, has faced demands for active engagement with North Korea. To the dismay of the US and other concerned states, China has thus far expressed unwillingness to employ any kind of leverage over North Korea. China's passive and seemingly indifferent posture has left many bewildered, wondering about the validity of its leverage status. In addition, many observers have begun to cast doubt on China's relations with North Korea. Such suspicion naturally leads one to ask what is keeping China from engaging itself with North Korea on the issue. Why is it that China cannot dare to make an initiative on the nuclear problem? Why is it not even being consulted by North Korea on the matter? Why can it not offer a hand to Pyongyang? What makes it so uncomfortable with its relations with North Korea? Historically, as examined and reviewed above, the history of the relationship between China and North Korea has been marked more by political anxiety and difficulties than by friendship and feelings of closeness. In other words, there were more bad times than good times in their relationship. During the past 54 years, it seems that there were more times filled with a feeling of disparity, anxiety, uneasiness and betrayal. Exchanges of high-level officials were cut off between 1963 and 1978, aside from unofficial visits such as Zhou Enlai's in 1971. From 1982-92, it was North Korea that sent a delegation and high-ranking officials to China on 85 different occasions, while China only reciprocated 14 times (Chen, Wang, 2002: 307). Military shootouts between the two took place on at least three occasions in the '60s. Since the inception of its own communist ideology in 1955, North Korea did not regard China as its political patron, instead adopting and practicing equidistant diplomacy with the Soviet Union. These feelings of mistrust may also have developed out of the two countries' perception of each other as a consequence of their respective domestic development. While China was undergoing the Cultural Revolution for 10 years, experiencing economic hardship, North Korea was relatively well off, its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita reaching in the range of US$1,200-$1,900 in 1978. After China took off economically with its open-door policy, the economic cycle in North Korean began to spiral in the opposite direction, reaching its nadir in the early '90s. North Korea now is the biggest beneficiary of China's economic assistance and aid, with food and energy standing at 90 percent and 70 percent respectively, according to estimates. Under the circumstances, many believe that cutting off all this economic aid would have an influence on North Korea's behavior. But would it? Immediate economic sanction by China against North Korea would have the leverage effect on North Korea's behavior that the international diplomatic community would like to see. However, it might also generate undesirable side-effects: exodus of North Korean refugees into China, Japan, and South Korea because of economic hardship, and the collapse of the Kim Jong-il regime. Against this potential chaos, many observers of China affairs, including the Chinese themselves, have run their computers and concluded that it would be of much greater advantage and benefit for China to keep holding the supporting line for North Korea. In addition, survival of North Korea would maintain a buffer function to China's national-security interests in Northeast Asia. With all these calculations taken into account, China has decided to join those who support solving the case through a multinational cooperation effort. Its decision is not out of sheer desire to prolong the life of North Korea and its mission as a buffer against the United States. It is based on its firm and unyielding belief that only international organizations such as the United Nations have the right, authority, justification and legitimacy to intervene in and solve international crises. It also understands that it can play a much bigger role in the North Korean nuclear crisis if it were to participate in such an organization, as it knows that multinational cooperation is incomplete and ineffective without its participation. Although the record of its behavior and voting might not support China's claim to status in the international effort, however, China voted on February 13 at the International Atomic Energy Agency council meeting to agree to submit the North Korean nuclear case to the Security Council. This may have been a prelude to China's decision to pursue daguo waijiao (big-state diplomacy), by which it will have to assume more responsibility and leadership in its diplomatic practice and in world affairs. 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